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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
R~~'rTY .A~K H.EN, 
.Applicant and Appellant, 
y:-;. 
I ~DF~TRL.\ L CO~l~rTSSION OF 
FT.\H. ~PI·:BHY RA};D CORPOR-
AT£0~ and LIBERTY :MUTUAL 
I~sFIL\XCE CO~IPANY, 
Defrndants and Respondents. 
DEFEXDANTS' BRIEF 
X.\TFRE OF THE C.&SE 
Cas·e No. 
9969 
Thi~ i~ an appeal from a denial of injury benefits 
undt>r the 'Vorkmen's Compensation Act. 
DlsPOsTTTOX IX IXD1~RTRIAL CO~LJliSSION 
.After ~1 hearing-, the Industrial Commission con-
cluded applicant's proof failed to establish that her 
injurit'~ aro~r out of or in the course of her employment 
and after her application for rehearing was denied, this 
ap})e'al followed. 
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STATEMENT O:B.., F AOTS 
Applicant was an employee of Sperry Utah Engineer-
ing Laboratory, a division of defendant Sperry Rand, 
at its plant located on the Clearfield Naval Base. In the 
plant building where applicant worked was a cafeteria 
operated for Sperry bry Clark, Inc., an independent con-
tractor engaged in the business of supplying food and 
operating food services in manufacturing plants (R. 68). 
On the day of her injury, applicant had purchased 
and eaten her lunch in the cafeteria and was taking her 
tray to the dish washing area, as was the custom, when 
she fell on the floor, sustaining injuries for which she 
sought compensation (R. 19). 
At the hearing before the Industrial Commission, 
it was shown that employees of the plant were not rfl-
quired to eat at the cafeteria and only about 35 per cent 
of them did. Others ate at the Navy Cafeteria on the 
naval base, or at public restaurants, while many brought 
lunches from home or went hom·e to lunch (R. 28). 
During the lunch period, employees were on their 
own time and were not paid for that time. Plant rules 
required them to "check in" to the work area at the be-
ginning of the shift and to "check out" four hours later 
foT lunch. After lunch, they again checked in and finally 
checked out at the end of the day. This ''check in and 
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('h('ek out ~y:·dPm" was not in eff·ect during the lunch peri-
od and tho~P who enten·d or h--ft the building in that 
pt>riotl did so without control h!· SpPrry (R. 31, 32). 
~~ollowin~ the ( 1ommi:-;sion hearing, .a copy of the 
agreement lwtwE'Pn SpE'IT). and Clark waH furnished to 
the Commission at the n·qtwst of the Referee (R. 67). 
By tlw tt•rm~ of this agreement, the entire control, man-
agement and supervision of the cafeteria area and fa-
eilitiP~ was surn•JHlPrPd to Clark to run as it chose, the 
only eX('Pption being the "food :-;ervice dining area floors, 
walls, cPilings and window:-;,'' as to which the "respon-
~ihility for elPaning, waxing and mopping" remained 
with ~\H'ITY (R. 70-71 ). The responsibility for all other 
art>a~. facilitit·~, services and ·operations was .assumed 
by Clark. Even the cleaning responsibility for the "din-
ing room tables and chairs" was given to Clark (R. 71). 
FndPr the agreement it was provided that "the prices 
<•harged by Clark, Inc., for foods and other products 
sold ~hall be reasonable" ( R. 73) and the "price of me·r-
rhaJHli~~' dispensed from the vending machines must be 
the reasonable and fair market price charged by com-
parable competitor~ within this area" (R. 69). 
Based upon the foregoing evidence, the Commission 
found tl1at "The cafeteria was operated hy Clark, Inc. 
on prPmi~E':' owned by Sperry Rand Corporation under 
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a contractual arrangement which in our opinion does not 
indicate that Sperry exercised direction or control over 
employees while on their lunch hour" (R. 40). 
Applicant's claim for compensation was denied as 
was also her Amended Application for Rehearing (R. 
78-80) and applicant then filed her Petition for Writ of 
Review in this Court ( R. 81-83). 
ARGUMENT 
THE FINDING BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
THAT APPLICANT'S INJURIES WERE NOT SUFFI-
CIENTLY RELATED TO AND, HENCE, DID NOT ARISE 
OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HER EMPLOYMENT IS 
AMPLY SUPPORTED IN THE RECORD AND THE DENIAL 
OF HER CLAIM WAS NOT ERROR. 
This Court in a long line of cases has established 
and repeatedly affirmed the standard by which it must 
be guided in cases where an applicant appeals from a 
denial by the Industrial Commission of his claim to 
workmen's compensation benefits. Thus, as it stated in 
Jones v. California Packing Corp. (Vtah 1952), 2++ P. 2d 
640 at 642, quoting from T¥ oodburn v. Industrial Com-
mwsion (Utah 1947), 181 P. 2d. 209: 
"The extent of review by this court in this 
t~cpe of cas·e is : Did the Commission act without 
or in excess of its powers in denying compensation 
to the plaintiff~ * * * 
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"In the ra:-;C' of denial of compensation, the 
re•·ord mu:-;t di:-;<'losP that there is material, sub-
Htant in\, rompetent, uncontradicted evidence· suffi-
eiPnt to make a disregard of it justify the 
t•otwln:-;ion, as a mattPr of law, that the Industrial 
( \Hnmi:-;:-;ion arbitrarily and capriciously disre-
g-anh·<l the evidence or unrPasonahl:' refused to 
hf11liPvP :-;neh evidence." 
Thi:-; stnndanl for review was again reiterated h:' 
this 'Court in thP n'<'Pnt case of I~a 11:; v. TV estern States 
Ut•fiuing Co. (Ftah 1963), :~~-1- P. 2d 101;), in different 
term:', n~ follow:-;: 
", .. our ~tatnh•, Section 35-1-85, U.C.A. 1953, 
g-rant~ the Commission the prerogative of finding 
tlw fad~. "\Vhen it has denied the application for 
rompensation and a reversal is sought, the appli-
rant, as the moving party, has the burden of 
showing that the evidence is such that a finding 
in her favor is the only reasonable finding that 
could be made, so that the Commission's refusal 
to ~o find was capricious and arbitrary." (Em-
pha~i~ supplied.) 
\Yhen measured against this standard, it becomes 
()h\·ion:' that appPllant, in this appeal from the denial of 
rompen:'ation, both misconceives the burden which the 
law c~l:'t~ upon her as the appellant and misunderstands 
the real meaning of the ntunerous cases and other au-
thoritit'~ which she rites in support of her position. 
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Appellant assum'es from the fact that the Commis-
sion could have found for her under the evidence, which 
respondents concede, that it was error for it not to have 
done so. However, before appellant can prevail on this 
appeal, she must sustain her burden as outlined above 
and show that from the evidence the only reasonable 
finding that could be made would be in her favor and that 
the Commission capriciously and arbitrarily refused to 
so find. 
As is apparent from the record, this is clearly not 
such a case. Rather, there is ample competent, substantial 
and credible evidence in the record which shows an ab-
sence of control over applicant by Sperry and an absencf' 
of control over the premises in which she was at the 
time of her accident. :l\Ioreover, the record shows that 
the relationship between applicant's injury and her em-
ployment \Yas extremely tenuous at best. 
Although the cafeteria was located within the build-
ing in which Sperry's Clearfield Plant was located, it 
was operated, managed and controlled by Clark, Inc., 
a business entity which was and is completPly inde-
pendent of and unrelated to Sperry, except through its 
eontract with Sperry. Clark, Inc., hired its o~wn em-
ployees, prepared its own menus and, except for "cle.an-
ing, waxing and mopping" of the dining room area 
which was left to Sperry, it exercised a complete super-
vision and control over the ·entire space comprising the 
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cafetPrin. Similarly, the priers charged by Clark, Inc. 
for its pro<ln<"ts and sprviees were determined by it, 
within thl' sindr limitation that the prices had to be 
rt:ast>nahle and in linP with those charged by "comparable 
compt·t itors" within the immediate area (R. 69). The 
~·om parable t'()ttq wt it ors, of course, included the Navy 
l~a:-;1• Cafeteria and est.ablishme·nts in Clearfield and 
La~·ton . 
. \.nyone was fre<' to use thP cafeteria facilities as, 
for Pxample, visitors and vendors (R. :~~). Employe-es 
of ~pPtTy were similarly free to use the cafeteria fa-
eilitit•s, which .approximately one-third of them did (R. 
:;o). or, if t lwy chose, go to the Navy Basr Cafeteria or 
into Layton or Clearfield, or bring their own lunch, which 
the remaining two-thirds of them did (R. 28). The plant 
l'al'l'tt-ria wa~ in pn·r~· material respect, including facili-
tit>:-:, ~Prvict'~ and prices, c01npar.able to and competitive 
with the Xavy Base Cafderia and similar establishments 
in Clearfield and Layton. Insofar as Sperry was con-
l't'rned, it made no difference whatsoever whether the 
employer·:-: ate at the plant or went ~l:se\Yhere. In fact, 
a~ rgard~ en•n ~pt>ny employees, the plant cafeteria 
ditl't'rPd from the :Xav~· Ba~e Cafeteria and Pating es-
tablishment:-: in Clearfield and Layton only in the respect 
that it wa~ located within the Sperry plant and was, 
tht•n•fnn', l·lo~er to their place of employment. But this 
proximity wa~ insufficient to cause even a majority of 
the employee~ to patronize it. 
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On the basis of the foregoing evidence the Commis-
sion was amply justified in finding that Sperry did not 
eJrercise control over employee·s while on their lunch 
period. Certainly it exercised no more control during 
the lunch period over its employees who used the plant 
cafeteria than it exercised over the majority of its em-
ployees who ate elsewhere. 
Upon passing from the plant area into the plant 
cafeteria Sperry's employees passed from an area super-
vi·sed and controlled by Sperry and into an area where 
supervision and control was exercised by Clark, Inc., an 
entirely different and independent business entity. In so 
doing they passed from the "sp:atiallimits" of their em-
ployment with Sperry just as much as if they had left 
the plant and gone to the Navy Cafeteria or into Layton 
or Clearfield. And, if she had sustained her injuries at 
those establishments it is clear that she would not be 
entitled to compensation for her injuries. 
·Thus, this case should be governed by the same rule 
which was applied in Hold itch v. Sta11-dard Accident Ins. 
Co. (5th Cir. 1953), 208 F. 2d 721, wherein the plaintiff 
sustained injuries during her lunch period when she 
tripped and fell as she was leaving a store "immediately 
next door" to the plant of her •employer, where she had 
gone to buy some gum for herself and her fellow em-
ployees. N·otwithstanding a showing by plaintiff that the 
gum was purchased by employees to relax them and keep 
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them from getting thirsty and to keep them from eating 
peeans and fruit that went into the employer's cakers, the 
('tHtrt there affirmed a determination by the Commission 
that the accident "did not arise out of and was not sus-
tained in the roursP of her employment." 
XPnrly all of the numerous authorities cited in .ap-
pellant'~ brief, to support her claim that it was error 
for the Commission to deny her claim, including the 
recent ease of Wilson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Utah 
1963). :~S-l P. 2d 400, deal expressly with a situation in 
which the injuries were sustained upon premises con-
trolled and sup('rvised by the employer and used by him 
as an integral part of his business. An appeal by the 
employer ratlwr than the employee, moreover, is involved 
in Thomas r. Proctor & Gamble. Mfg. Co. (Kan. 1919), 
179 Pae. 37~; Employer's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Comm. 
(Colo. 192-l), 230 Pac. 394; Twin Pe.aks Canning Co. v. 
bul. Cnmm. (Ftah 1921), 196 Pac. 853; Goodyear Acft. 
Corp. 1'. Ind. Cnmm. (Ariz. 1945), 158 P. 2d 511; Hum-
plir".'' r. Ind. Comm. (Ill. 1918), 120 N.E. 816; Zarba v. 
Lane (Mass. 19-17), 76 N.E. 2d 318; Texas Em,ployer.s' 
,,,~. Assoc. r. Davidson (1Tex. 1956), 295 S.E. 2d 482; 
American J/otors Corp. v. Ind. Comrn. (Wise. 1957), 83 
X.\Y. ~dil-l; Dyer ~·.Sears. Roebuck & Co. (Mich. 1957), 
~3 X.\Y. 2d 152: and Caporale v. Department of Taxation 
and Fina.,~ee (X.Y. 1957), 142 N.E. 2d 213. In National 
S11rt'/y Corp. r. BeUah (5th Cir. 1957), 245 F. 2d 936, 
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as in the Wilson case supra in Utah, the employee ap-
pealed from a finding in the lower court that his injury 
came within the Workmen's Compensation Act which 
finding was affirmed on appe.al. 
Not a single case or other authority cited by ap-
pellant supports the proposition upon which she must 
pr·evail, if at all, that the Comn1ission had to find in her 
favor as the only reasonable conclu.sion it could have 
arrived .at under the evidence. Appellant's cases and au-
thorities simply stand for the proposition that findings 
have be~en made and sustained which permitted a re-
covery of compens.a tion on evidence which was similar 
to, though distinguishable from, that in the present case. 
In determining whether the premises upon which 
an employee sustains injuries are the "employer's 
premises" or in the "zone of employment" or within the 
spatial limits of the employment for purposes 'Of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, the test is stated thus ir.. 
99 C.J.S. 825 (\Yorkmen's OOinpensation, Section 234 
(h)): 
" ... the word 'premises' should be given a rea-
sonable interpretation, but it has .also been held 
to be used in a limited sense. The word has been 
held to mean the part of the property of the 
e1nployer where the employee is ·to do his work, 
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in•rrpss and egress, and, ordinarily should be ap-
n • plif'd to that portion of an employer's premises 
upon which the plant equipment is located. 
• • • • 
"A 'zone of employment' in this connection 
has lwen defined .as the place of employment and 
thP area therefrom, 'ttnder the control of the em-
ployer, or the premises owned or controlled by 
the employPr or adjacent premises so near thereto 
as to be considPred a part of the employer's prem-
i~rs u•hen he exercises some direction or control 
thereof." (Emphasis supplied.) 
As is stated in 1 Larsen's 'Vorkmen's Compensation 
Law, ~t'dion 21.21 pp. 298-99 in discussing situations 
in which the course of employment goes beyond the fixed 
hour:-; of work, including "unpaid lunch hours on the 
pr('misl}:o;." 
"In e.ach instance the time, although strictly 
outside fiX'ed working hours, is closely contiguous 
to them ... and, above all, the employee is within 
the spatial limits of his employment." (Emphasis 
added.) 
It will be noted that appellant places heavy reliance 
upon Lar,sen's, supra, to support her position and, 
further, that the above language is included in the quo-
tation from Larsen's at page 13 of appellant's brief. 
~imilar references, express or by implication, to the 
"employer's premises'' will be noted in nearly all of the 
authoriti('s citM in appellant's brief. 
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Analagous to the facts here pres·ented are the rases 
in which it has been held that even injuries which are 
sustained by employees on a parking lot which is owned, 
maintained and controlled by the employer are not neces-
sarily compensable unless the parking lot is so loc.atPcl 
and used as to make it an integral part of the employl'r's 
business operations. See, e.g. Johnson Bros. LmnlJPr Co. 
v. Hood (Ky.), 330 S.\V. 2d 929; Vardzel v. Dravo Corp. 
(Pa. 1960), 165 A. 2d 622; Evans v. Jones-Wils·on Inc. 
(S.C.), 110 S.E. 2d 851; Sheridan v. Glen Alden Coal Co. 
(Pa.), 50 A. 2d 540; Be'nnett v. l' anderbilt Univ. (Tenn. 
1955), 277 S.W. 2d 386; Purington v. Dept. of Labor and 
Industries (Wash.), 170 P. 2d 656; Finley r. St. Louis 
Smelting and Refining Co. (Mo. 1950), 233 S.VV. 2d 725; 
Levengood v. N. Y. Shipbuilding Corp. (N. J. 1946), 48 
A. 2d 570; Storment v. Licari-Packard Grosse Pointe 
(Mich.), 50 N.W. 2d 762. 
The principle applied in these cases has equal per-
suasive force under the present facts. Thus, in the 
Finley case the employee's shift was "from 7:30a.m. to 
3 :30 p.m., and as usual he came up from \York under-
ground at 3 :1 :J p.n1.," washed and changed his clothes 
and at 3:25 p.1n. got to his car on the company's parking 
lot which was "located on the company's property," which 
lot the cmnpany maintained for "the 1nutual benefit of 
it and its emplyees." He was injured "Then he raised 
the car hood and the engine fan caught his hand. The 
court there held that there wa~ "no casual connection 
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hPtween the injury and the employment" and an award 
of compPn~at ion wa:-; reversed. 
In the Uennett case the employee sustained injuries 
as slw walked :.wro:-;:-; the parking lot of her employer 
toward lwr automobile at the end of the day. The lot was 
owned, maintained and controlled by the employer. The 
court then• noted at page 388 of its opinion: 
" ... there is a distinction between the 'premises' 
and the 'prop<>rty' of the employer, as used in 
eompensation cases. While all property O\'vned 
by an employer may be likewise called 'premises' 
in general u:-;agC', but it is obvious from our 
('a~<'~. that 'premises' under our compensation 
statute' means the part of the property where· the 
employee is to do his work, including that part 
which he is required to use for ingress and 
Pgrps:-;." 
~\ dPnial of compensation to the employee was affirmed. 
The v· ard2el case involved an appeal from an award 
again~t the employer in a personal injury action wherein 
the employee's injuries were sustained whi.le walking 
aero~~ the employer's parking lot at the conclusion of 
hi:' ~hift. The court stated at page 623: 
..... it is obvious that the parking lot was not 
a part of the operating business; it was distinct 
therefrom and separated from defendant's plant 
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by a public thoroughfare. * * '* The word 'prem-
ises' cannot be enlarged in its meaning and appli-
cation so as to include land or property outside 
of that used in connection \Yith the actual premises 
where the ernployer carries on the business in 
which the employee is engaged. * * * The use of 
this facility was optional with each employee.'' 
(Emphasis added.) 
From these cases it is obvious that had the control 
and management of the parking lot been transferred 
to an independent third party at the time of the injury, 
as was the plant cafeteria in the present case, it would 
not have been error to have denied compensation there-
for. 
Nor is the Wilson case, upon which appellant places 
such heavy reliance, contrary to the rule of the au-
thorities cited above. That case, as noted supra, involved 
an .appeal by the employee from a determination by 
the lower court that the Workmen's Compensation Act 
was the exclusive remedy. The employee was there in-
jured "while attempting to take advantage of ... (the 
privilege of purchasing n1erchandise at a discount and 
taking delivery thereof) during the noon hour and while 
on the employer's premises." (Emphasis added.) This 
Court there noted that "most of the cas-es hold that the 
servant has the protection of the compensation acts 
while attempting to take advantage of sueh privileges." 
There was no question in that case but that the lot was 
own·ed, maintained and controlled by he employer and 
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that it was an integral part of it~ business activities, 
~inre it was provided prin1arily for its business eusto-
1111'1':-i. ~lorpover, in the 1Vilson case the injuries were 
<'Ull~t>d when a pile of tltP cmploye1's tires fell on her, 
apparently hP<'a n~P they had been improperly stacked 
hy ttw t'nlJJloyl'r's t'IIIJJloyces. This rase cannot stand for 
thP propostion that it was error to deny compensation 
in thP prp:-;pn t <'ase, which is dissimilar factually and 
pnwedurally from the Wilson case. 
In addition to the que~tion, discussed above, whether 
the premise8 upon which the employee is injured are 
clo:-;ply enough related to the emplo'Yment to cOinpel an 
award of <'ontprn~ation to the employee, which as pointed 
out ahon' i~ not so under the present facts, a further, 
relatt'd, question i~ presented by the present appeal as 
tn whether there is a causal relationship between the 
injuries and the en1ployment. Certainly the Commission 
wa~ ju~tified in finding as it did from the evidence that 
no surh eausal relation existed in the present case. 
Thi~ same question was before the court in Coston 
r. Carne.oic-Illinois Steel Corp. (Ohio 1952), 125 N.E. 2d 
;:~6, which "·as factually and procedurally similar to the 
present ea~e. There, an en1ployee, who had no specific 
time off for lunch, swallowed a piece of glass concealed 
in a piece of pie which he had purchased in a restaurant 
on the employer's premises, operated by an independent 
enntraetor. It was held that his resulting injuries were 
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not compensable because they were not proximatelr 
caused by the employment. The court noted at page 737: 
" ... an injury occurs in the course of and arises 
out of the employment within the meaning of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act if such injury fol-
lowed as a natural incident of the work and as a 
result of exposure occasioned by the nature, con-
ditions and surroundings of the employment. 
* * * * 
"It arises 'out of' the employment, when it is 
apparent to the rational mind upon consideration 
of all the circumstances, a causal connection exists 
between the conditions under which the work is 
required to be performed and the resulting in-
jury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen 
to have followed as a natural incident of the work 
and to have been contemplated by a reasonable 
person familiar with the whole situation as a 
result of the exposure occasioned by the nature 
of the employment, then it arises 'out of' the em-
ployment. But it excludes an injury which cannot 
fairly be traced to the employment as a contri-
buting proximate cause and which comes from 
a hazard to which the workmen would have been 
equally exposed apart from the employment. The 
causative danger must be peculiar to the work 
and not common to the neighborhood. It must be 
incidental to the character of the business and not 
independent of the relation of n1aster and servant. 
It need not have been foreseen or expected, but 
after the event it must appear to have had its 
origin in a risk connected with the employment, 
and to have flowed from that source as a rational 
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ronseqUPIH'P." (Quoting from In re Employers 
J,iabilif,lt A .......... l/rauce (•n''l'· (~fass.), 10~ N.E. 2d 
,,, j • ·q-) 
Tlw eourt eoncluded at 7:17 that, measured by the 
rule of the quoted languagP, 
.. \r e do not believe that the facts in the in-
~tant ea~e sati:::;fy this rule nor conform to its 
Pssential require.ments. Plaintiff's employment 
rannot be ~aid to be a contributing cause of his 
injury. His injury cannot be said to have fol-
lowed as a natural incident to the work and to 
han' been contemplated by a reasonable person 
familiar with the whole situation. 
* * * * 
"Plaintiff's injury was not received in the 
t·oursp 'Of or arising out of his employment . 
and aeeonlingly the judgment of the eourt of 
conunon pleas is affirmed." 
Thi~ Court stated in Ctah Oopper Co. v. Jn,d. Comm. 
(rtah Ul~O), 37 1~tah 118, 193 Pac. 2-!, that "Society is 
interested in seeing that industries bear the expense of 
ea ring for those injured while working in such indus-
tries." By the same token, industry must not be burdened 
by t11e costs of injuries which are not c·ausally connected 
to the employrnent. 
Certainly, the applicant's injuries in the present case 
are no more closely related to, and no more foreseeable 
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as an incident of, her employment than were the plain-
tiff's injuries in the Coston case, supra. Nor can it be 
contended that applicant's injuries resulted from a dan-
ger "peculiar to the work,'' or that she would not "have 
been equally exposed apart from her employment," if 
she had decided to buy and ·eat her dinner in a restaurant 
located off her employer's premises, which she was free 
t'O do. The cause of her injuries had no relation whatever 
to the relation of master and servant between herself 
and Sperry Rand Corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
The test of control by the employer over the premises 
whe.re the injury occurs, which has been repeatedly and 
consistently applied by the courts over the years as noted 
above, has proved to be a logical and workable standard 
by which to govern the granting or denial of compensa-
tion in this type of case. This was the standard by which 
the Commission determined that applica:nt's injuries oc-
curred on premises which were not controlled by her 
emplo'Yer and, further, that the relationship between 
her employment and the injur:r was too tenuous to justify 
an award of compensation. 
It must be kept in mind that it was never intended 
that all injuries suffered by an employee should be taxed 
to the etmployer, but only those which have a direct causal 
connection with the services which the employee is hired 
to perform. 
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It is not suffi<'irnt at thi~ point for appellant to 
~how that an award in her favor could have been made 
in the prP~Pnt <·a~P. Rather, she must show than an 
award in her favor ''"a~ the only reaso1wbl~ choice which 
the Commission had in viP'W of the evidence. She has not 
and eannot ma kP such a showing here and the denial of 
her claim for compensation should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~KEE~. \YORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
JOHN H. SNOW 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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